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This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-country OLG economy, where each 
country is characterized by asymmetric information between the government and the private 
sector, and where one of the countries outsources part of its production to the other. In the 
country whose firms outsource production abroad, the government will respond to 
outsourcing by implementing a more progressive labor income tax structure and higher 
marginal capital income tax rates than it would have done in the absence of outsourcing. The 
tax policy response by the government in the country that receives foreign production 
capacity is, in general, ambiguous and depends on a tradeoff between wage-equality and 
factor income from abroad. By using the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference 
case, we also consider tax policy cooperation leading to higher welfare. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
International outsourcing has become an increasingly important business practice, and is 
meant to imply that firms locate part of their production process in another country. 
Earlier research shows that wage differentials across countries constitute important 
driving forces behind this behavior, as the costs will be reduced if part of the production 
is located to a country with lower wages.
1 There is also empirical evidence suggesting 
that outsourcing of production to other countries leads to more wage-inequality in the 
sense of increasing the domestic skill-premium.
2 However, despite that international 
outsourcing may deteriorate the income prospects of the low-skilled in countries that 
outsource production abroad, and despite that it may cause income redistribution and 
externalities at the international level, outsourcing has so far received very little 
attention in the literature on optimal income taxation. Two questions immediately come 
to mind. First, how would a national government – whose objective is based on the 
domestic welfare - adjust its redistributive tax policy in response to international 
outsourcing? Second, does this type of outsourcing justify tax policy cooperation at the 
international level? The present paper attempts to answer these two questions. The main 
purpose is to analyze how outsourcing affects the optimal income tax structure in a 
dynamic economy, where we make a distinction between, on the one hand, the country 
whose firms locate part of their production abroad and, on the other, the host-country 
that receives foreign production structure with employment opportunities for its own 
labor force. This also provides a natural framework for studying the international 
externalities that outsourcing gives rise to and, as a consequence, to analyze the welfare 
effects of policy cooperation between countries. 
 
To be able to explore the relationships between outsourcing, wage-inequality and 
optimal redistributive taxation, we incorporate outsourcing into a model-economy 
comprising two countries, where each country is characterized by two ability-types and 
asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. Our model is, 
                                                 
1   See, e.g., Amiti and Wei (2005), Rishi and Saxena (2004) and Sinn (2007). For an overview, see 
Hummels et al. (2001). At the same time, wage differentials alone may exaggerate the incentives 
for outsourcing due to a mismatch between technology and the skills of workers in less developed 
economies;  see, e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). 
2   See, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2003), Hijzen et al. (2005), Hsieh and Woo (2005), Egger 
and Egger, (2006), Hijzen (2007), Riley and Young (2007), Geishecker and Görg (2008) and 
Munch and Skaksen (2009).   3
therefore, an extension of the optimal income tax model with two ability-types 
developed in its original form by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), which is by now one 
of the major workhorses in the study of optimal taxation. The tax instruments that each 
national government has at its disposal are nonlinear taxes of labor income and capital 
income, respectively. Such a tax system constitutes a reasonably realistic description of 
the options available for income taxation. It also implies that the appearance of tax 
distortions at the second best optimum is a consequence of optimization subject to 
informational limitations only; it is not due to the necessity to raise revenue per se. A 
similar model was used by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a) to examine the consequences 
of outsourcing for optimal taxation, although their study is partial in the sense of 
focusing all attention on the country whose firms outsource production abroad. 
Furthermore, as their study is based on a static model, it does not contain capital income 
taxes. They show that if the government is able to control the amount of resources spent 
on outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, then outsourcing will not (by itself) modify 
the policy rules for marginal labor income taxation. However, if the government lacks a 
direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, then outsourcing contributes to a more 
progressive tax structure in the sense of decreasing the marginal labor income tax rate 
for the low-ability type and increasing it for the high-ability type. The intuition is that 
the income tax, in this case, serves as an indirect instrument to reduce the level of 
outsourcing and, therefore, avoid part of the wage-inequality that outsourcing would 
otherwise give rise to.
3 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in, at least, three ways. First, by considering 
a dynamic economy, we are able to analyze how the appearance of outsourcing modifies 
the structure of optimal capital income taxation; not just the labor income tax. As far as 
we know, there are no earlier studies dealing with the optimal mix of labor and capital 
                                                                                                                                               
 
3    In economies with equilibrium unemployment, outsourcing may also imply lost employment 
opportunities for the domestic labor force. Aronsson and Koskela (2009b) analyze optimal 
nonlinear taxation and provision of a public input good in an economy with outsourcing and 
equilibrium unemployment (due to a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type). 
See also Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009), who investigate the consequences of outsourcing for 
unemployment insurance and redistributive linear taxation. Wage and employment responses to 
labor taxation and/or specific labor tax reforms in economies with outsourcing and involuntary 
unemployment are analyzed by Koskela and Schöb (2008) and Koskela and Poutvaara (2008a, 
2008b, 2009). Ethier (2005) addresses the policy tradeoff between a lower skill-premium and 
employment among the low-skilled in a country undertaking outsourcing.   4
income taxation in this particular context.
4 Such a study is clearly relevant, as the 
incentives for capital formation provides an additional channel via which public policy 
may influence the level of outsourcing. It is also relevant as a complement to the study 
by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a) mentioned above, which only considers optimal labor 
income taxation. Second, earlier studies dealing with redistributive taxation or other 
aspects of public policy in economies with outsourcing have typically focused attention 
on the country whose firms outsource production to other countries; not on the host-
country whose residents receive income from abroad.
5 The present study, on the other 
hand, considers a two-country economy, where one of the countries (referred to as the 
North) moves part of its production to another country (referred to as the South). We 
will then characterize the optimal tax structure as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash 
game between the two national governments. Third, outsourcing gives rise to 
international externalities, which are not fully internalized by the policies implemented 
by national governments. This suggests that policy cooperation (if properly designed) 
may lead to higher social welfare. We will, therefore, also analyze some aspects of tax 
policy cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel aspect in the literature 
on taxation and outsourcing. 
 
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which is an 
overlapping generations (OLG) economy with two countries, North and South, and two 
ability-types in each country, where each consumer lives for two periods. In each 
country, firms produce a homogeneous good by using labor (of both ability-types) and 
capital. In addition, the firms in the North may also locate production activities carried 
out by low-skilled labor to the South (where the before-tax wage rate is lower). To be 
able to capture the effects of outsourcing in a simple way, we abstract from other 
sources of interaction between the countries. This simplification enables us to avoid the 
issue of tax competition for mobile production factors, which has been studied 
extensively in other literature.
6 Section 3 concerns the optimal tax structure implicit in a 
                                                 
4    Earlier studies on optimal nonlinear taxation in dynamic models address a variety of issues such 
as, e.g., the conditions under which we ought to use, or not use, capital income taxation as a 
supplement to the labor income tax in an economy with competitive markets (Ordover and Phelps, 
1979; Brett, 1997; Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2001); the consequences of equilibrium unemployment 
for optimal income taxation (Aronsson et al. 2009); and optimal income taxation in economies 
where the consumers have positional preferences (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, in press).  
5   An exception is the study by Egger and Falkinger (2006), which examines the implications of 
public infrastructure investments in a two-country economy. 
6          See, e.g. Wilson (1986, 1999).   5
noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Our results show, among other things, that the 
appearance of outsourcing provides an incentive for the government in the North to 
implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher 
marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type, i.e. in this sense a more 
progressive labor income tax structure, as well as implementing higher marginal capital 
income tax rates for both ability-types than it would otherwise have done. The policy 
responses to outsourcing by the southern government are, in general, ambiguous, as the 
desire to relax the self-selection constraint counteracts the incentive to increase the 
budgetary gain of outsourcing. We also show that the appearance of outsourcing 
extends the production-inefficiency arguments for capital income taxation discussed in 
earlier literature (Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001, Aronsson et al. 2009), as the relationship 
between outsourcing and capital formation influences the wage distribution in both 
countries. In Section 4, we address tax policy cooperation. We show how joint 
agreements among the countries to change the marginal labor and/or capital income 
taxes can be designed to increase the welfare. The results are summarized and discussed 
in Section 5. 
 
2.    The Model 
 
In this section, we consider an OLG economy comprising two countries, which will be 
referred to as North (n) and South (s). We assume that North outsources part of its 
production to South, which will be explained more thoroughly below. Now, we describe 
the consumers and firms as well as the outcome of private optimization. 
 
2.1.   Consumers  
 
In each country, the consumers live for two periods. Following the approach in earlier 
comparable literature, we assume that each consumer works during the first period of 
life and does not work during the second. There are two types of consumers; a low-
ability type (denoted by superindex 1) and a high-ability type (denoted by superindex 
2). The distinction between ability-types refers to productivity, which is interpreted to 
mean that the high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage rate than the low-ability 
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type. As the number of individuals of each ability-type and generation is not important 
for our understanding of the optimal policy responses to outsourcing, it will be 
normalized to one in what follows. This also means that we abstract from population 
growth. 
 
The utility function facing ability-type i in country j born in the beginning of 
period t is given by (for  1, 2 i =  and  , j ns = ) 
 
  ,, , 1 , (, ,)
ii i i
j tj t j t j t uu c xz + =               (1) 
 
where c denotes consumption when young, x consumption when old and z leisure when 
young (when old, all time available is used for leisure). Leisure is, in turn, defined as a 
time endowment, H, less the time spent in market work, l. 
 
Let w and κ  denote the before-tax hourly wage rate and saving, respectively, and 
r denote the before-tax interest rate. The individual budget constraint can then be 
written as 
 
  ,, , ,, , , ()
ii ii i i
j tj t j t j tj t j t j t wl T wl c κ −− =                                 (2) 
  , ,1 ,1 , ,1 ,1 (1 ) ( )
ii i
jt jt jt jt jt jt rr x κκ +++ + +− Φ =            (3) 
 
in which  ,, , ()
ii
jt jt jt Tw l  and  ,1 , 1 ()
i
jt jt t r κ ++ Φ  represent the labor income tax paid in period t 
(when young) and capital income tax paid in period t+1 (when old), respectively. Note 
that the tax functions may vary over time and across countries. The consumer prices are 
normalized to one for notational convenience. 
 




,, , , , , ,, (1 ( )) 0
ii i i i
jtc jt jt jt jt jtz uw Tw l u −− =                                (4) 
 
'
,, ,, , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 [1 ( ) ] 0
ii i
jtc jtx jt jt jt jt jt uu r r r κ ++ + + −+ +− Φ =          (5) 
   7
where we have used  ,, , , /
ii i
jtc jt jt uu c =∂ ∂ ,  ,, , , /
ii i
jtz jt jt uu z = ∂∂  and  ,, , , 1 /
ii i





jt jt jt Tw l  denotes the marginal labor income tax rate, whereas 
'
,1 , ,1 ()
i
jt jt jt r κ ++ Φ  in equation (5) denotes the marginal capital income tax rate. 
 
2.2.    Production 
 
Turning to the production side of the economy, we assume that each country is 
characterized by identical competitive firms producing a homogenous good under 
constant returns to scale using labor of both ability-types and capital. For notational 
convenience, we normalize the number of firms in each country to one. As we 
mentioned above, one of the countries, referred to as North (j=n), locates part of its 
production in the other country, referred to as South (j=s). To be more specific, we 
assume that the firms in the North partly use unskilled labor from the South in their 
production and have to pay the Southern low-skilled wage rate for their services. 
 
Production in the North 
 
By analogy to Koskela and Stenbacka (2007), the production function is written as 
11 2
,, , , (, , ) n nt n st nt nt Fl l l K δ + , where K is the capital stock. We assume that the production 
function is increasing in each of its three arguments, yet at a diminishing rate, i.e. 











































































































































, ns t l  is the low-skilled labor (measured in work hours) by residents in the 
South that are used by northern firms. The parameter δ  captures the idea that foreign 
                                                 
7          Instead of splitting the production function into a domestic and foreign part, we simplify by 
considering a single production function for the representative firm. Given the assumptions made 
about relationships between outsourcing and domestic production factors, this is not important for 
the results.   8
labor may not be a perfect substitute for domestic labor; therefore, one would normally 
expect  that  1 0 < < δ . In our framework, outsourcing is substitutable for domestic 
unskilled labor and complementary with domestic skilled labor, implying that 
outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality in the North. As mentioned above, this 
property is conformity with empirical evidence (see footnote 2). Ethier (2005) uses a 
similar production function (yet based on a specific functional form assumption) to 
study the effects of globalization on the skill-premium. There is also a capacity aspect 
of outsourcing, as the firm needs to build costly capacity abroad. We assume that while 
some activities are easy to outsource, other activities are more costly. Therefore, the 
marginal cost of outsourcing increases in the scope of activities to outsource, so that 
there is a capacity cost of outsourcing, 
1
, () ns t l ψ , which is increasing and convex, 
i.e.
11
,, '( ) 0, ''( ) 0 ns t ns t ll ψ ψ >≥ . This formulation captures the idea that outsourcing may 
necessitate costly investments into the establishment of network of suppliers in relevant 
host-countries. 
 
The objective function facing the firm at any time, t, can be written as 
 
 
11 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
,, , , , , , , , , , , , (, , ) ( ) nt n nt n st nt nt nt nt nt t n st st n st nt nt F l l l K wl wl l wl rK πδ ψ =+ −− − −− 
 
where (as before)  
1
, nt w  and 
2
, nt w  denote the before-tax wage rates paid to low-skilled 
and high-skilled labor, respectively, in the North and  , nt r  denotes the interest rate in the 
North, while 
1
, s t w  is the before tax wage rate paid to low-skilled labor the South in 




,, , ,, , (, , ) 0 nt n st nt nt nt nl Fl llK w δ + −=             (6) 
  2
11 2 2
,, , ,, , (, , ) 0 nt n st nt nt nt nl Fl llK w δ + −=             (7) 
 
11 2
,, , , , , (, , ) 0 nK nt n st nt nt nt Fl llK r δ + −=             (8) 
  1
11 2 1 1
,, , , , , , (, , ) ' ( ) 0 nt n st nt nt n st st nl Fl llK l w δδ ψ + −− = .          (9) 
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By using equation (9), we can write 
1
, ns t l  as a function of 
1
, nt l , 
2
, nt l ,  , nt K  (variables that the 
government in the North controls via tax policy; see below) and 
1
, s t w , i.e., 
 
 
11 1 2 1
,, , , , (,, , ) ns t ns n t n t n t s t ll l l K w
−+ − +
=             (10) 
 
where sign-indicator above each argument shows the qualitative comparative statics 
effect. 
 




,,, s td s tn s t lll =+ be the total labor supply in the South, where 
1
, ds t l  is the low-skilled 
labor supplied to domestic production in the southern economy. The production 
function is written as 
11 2
,, , , (, , ) s st n st st st Fl l l K −  and is assumed to have the same qualitative 
properties as the production function for the North described above, e.g.,  0 2 1 . >
l l s F , 
0 1 . >
K l s F  and  0 2 . >
K l s F . The objective function of the representative firm is given by 
 
 
11 2 1 11 2 2
,, , , , , , , , , , , (, , ) () s t s st n st st st st nt s nt st st st st Fl l l K w l l wl rK π =− − − −−. 
 




,, , , , , (, , )0 st n st st st st sl Fl llK w −− =           (11) 
  2
11 2 2
,, , , , , (, , )0 st n st st st st sl Fl llK w − −=           (12) 
 
11 2
,, , , , , (, , ) 0 sK st n st st st st Fl llK r − −= .          (13) 
 
For further use, note that equations (10) and (11) implicitly define the low-skilled wage 




11 1 2 1 2
, ,, ,,, , (,, ,,, ) s t s st st st nt nt nt ww l l K l l K
−+ −+ ++
= .         (14)   10
 
The intuition behind equation (14) is straight forward. For the variables accruing to the 
South, the influence of 
1
, s t l  reflects a labor supply effect on the wage rate (due to 
concavity of the production function), whereas the qualitative effects of 
2
, s t l  and  , s t K  are 
due to complementary between, on the one hand, unskilled labor and, on the other, 
skilled labor and capital. The effects of the northern variables, 
1
, nt l , 
2
, nt l  and  , nt K , follow 
from the properties of the production function in the North in combination with 
equation (10) above. 
 
 
3.     Optimal Taxation in a Noncooperative Equilibrium 
 
In this section, we begin by a presentation of the decision-problem facing each national 
government. We will then turn to the outcome in terms of optimal taxation of labor 
income and capital income at the national level, in case the two national governments 
act as Nash competitors to one another. 
 






,0 ,0 ,1 ,1 ( , , , ,....) jj j j j j WW uuuu =                              (15) 
 
for j=n, s, which allows for a unique welfare weight attached to the utility function of 
each ability-type and generation. 
 
The informational assumptions are conventional: the government observes the 
income of each individual, whereas ability is private information. This means that the 
government is not able to observe whether any given worker is a low-ability or high-
ability type. By concentrating on the “normal” case, where redistribution means income 
                                                 
8   Another approach would be to assume that the government aims at maximizing the utility of one 
particular ability-type and generation subject to minimum utility restrictions for all other ability-
types and generations. If we were to use this alternative approach (instead of using the social 
welfare function), all qualitative results derived below would remain unchanged.   11
transfers from the high-ability to the low-ability type, one would, therefore, like to 
prevent the high-ability type from mimicking the low-ability type in order to gain from 
redistribution. The self-selection constraint that may bind then becomes 
 
 
22 2 2 1 1 1 2




, ˆ j t u  denotes the utility of the mimicker and 
12
,, , /1 jt jt jt ww φ = <  is the wage ratio, 
i.e. the relative wage rate, in period t. Note that the mimicker faces the same income and 
consumption point as the low-ability type in both periods and, therefore, pays as much 
tax as the low-ability type. However, as the mimicker is more productive than the low-
ability type, he/she spends more time on leisure. We can interpret 
1
,, j tj t l φ  as the labor 
that the mimicker needs to supply in order to reach the same income as the low-ability 




,, , , , (,, , ) j t j jt jt jt n st llKl φφ = .           (17) 
 
For further use, note that 
1
,, /0 nt n st l φ ∂∂ <  and 
11
,, /0 st n st l φ ∂ ∂> . In other words, increased 




As we abstract from publicly provided goods, the resource constraint facing each 
national government can be written as 
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  and then differentiate with respect to  1
, lns t . 
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11 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
,1 , , , , , , , , , , , (, , ) nt nt n nt n st nt nt nt nt nt nt st n st KK F ll l K c c x x w l δ + − = + −−−−−     (18a) 
11 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
, 1, ,, , , ,,,, , , (, , ) s t st s st n st st st st st st st st n st K KF ll l K ccxxw l + − = − −−−−+    (18b) 
 
which imply that output is used for private consumption and net investments. The final 
term on the right hand side of each resource constraint arises because outsourcing gives 
rise to an income effect, which differs between the countries. This is so because part of 
the income generated by the North accrues to residents in the South. 
 
As the nonlinear taxes on labor income and capital income analyzed here imply 
that each national government can control the domestic consumption and work hours by 
each ability-type as well as the domestic capital stock, we follow the bulk of earlier 
literature on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation by considering a direct 
decision-problem. The decision-problem facing each national government will be 
written such that the government chooses work hours, consumption and capital stock to 
maximize the social welfare function presented in equation (15) subject to the self-
selection constraint and the resource constraint given by equation (16) and (18), 
respectively. We can then derive the optimal marginal (labor and capital) income tax 
rates needed to implement the second best resource allocation by combining the first 
order conditions for the government with those of the private sector. 
 
3.1    Optimal Taxation in the North 
 
The optimal tax problem in the North will be written such that the government chooses 
1
, nt l , 
1
, nt c , 
1
, nt x , 
2
, nt l , 
2
, nt c , 
2
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11
,, , , 1
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in which  , nt F  denotes the production function as specified in equation (18a) above. The 
government in the North recognizes that that 
1
, ns t l , 
1
, s t w  and  , nt φ  are determined by 
equation (10), (14) and (17), respectively, while treating the decision-variables of the   13
southern government (i.e. 
1
, s t l , 
1
, s t c , 
1
, s t x , 
2
, s t l , 
2
, s t c , 
2
, s t x  and  , s t K  for all t) as exogenous. 
The first order conditions are presented in the Appendix. 
 
To simplify the presentation of the results, we begin by deriving the welfare effect 
for the North of a small increase in outsourcing, i.e. a small increase in 
1
, ns t l . By using 
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.        (19) 
 
Equation (19) means that increased outsourcing leads to more wage-inequality and, 
therefore, reduces welfare in the North. Now, recall from equations (10) and (14) that 
the government in the North may influence 
1
, ns t l  by changing 
1
, nt l , 
2
, nt l  and  , nt K . We can 
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Therefore, an increase in 
1
, nt l , 
2
, nt l  and  , nt K , respectively, affects 
1
, ns t l  via two channels; 
first, a direct effect (measured by equation (10) with 
1
, s t w  held constant) and, second, an 
indirect effect via 
1
, s t w  (defined by equation (14)). As the sign below each component 
indicates, none of these total derivatives can be signed in the general case. To be able to 
relate our results to those presented by Aronsson and Koskela (2009a), we add the 
assumption that the direct effect of 
1
, nt l , 
2
, nt l  and  , nt K , respectively, dominates the 
corresponding indirect effect via the foreign wage rate for southern low-skilled labor. 
This assumption is based on the idea that the amount of southern labor used by northern 
firms is small relative to the aggregate number of work hours supplied by the low-
skilled in the South, which means that the behavior of northern firms has a relatively   14
modest effect on the wage rate facing the low-skilled in the South. Formally, our 
assumption is summarized as follows; 
 







































   
The marginal labor income tax rate of the low-ability type can be derived by 
combining equations (A1), (A2) and (4), while the marginal labor income tax rate of the 

























=   
denote the marginal rate of substituting between leisure and private consumption for the 
young ability-type i and the young mimicker, respectively. We show in the Appendix 
that the marginal labor income tax rates can be written as 
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.     (21) 
 
In equation (20), the first term on the right hand side is due to the self-selection 
constraint and contributes to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type. The intuition is that a higher marginal labor income tax rate makes 
mimicking less attractive, ceteris paribus, and, therefore, creates room for additional 
redistribution. Also the second term on the right hand side of equation (20) and the 
analogous first term on the right hand side of equation (21) reflect the self-selection 
although for a different reason: changes in 
1
, nt l  and 
2
, nt l  affect the wage ratio and, 
therefore, the labor that the mimicker needs to supply in order to reach the same income 
as the low-ability type. Normally, we would expect this component to increase the 
marginal labor income tax rate of the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income   15
tax rate of the high-ability type. These effects – which would also appear without 
outsourcing - are well understood from earlier research (Stiglitz, 1982). 
 
The final two terms on the right hand side of equation (20) and (21), respectively, 
are due to the appearance of outsourcing; the first arises because a change in the use of 
outsourced labor affects the self-selection constraint, and the second is a budget effect 
due to that the domestic factor income no longer matches domestic output. We will refer 
to the joint effect of these two terms as the direct effect of outsourcing.
10 With 
assumption A1 at our disposal, both these components contribute negatively to the 
marginal labor income tax rate of the low-ability type and positively to the marginal 
labor income tax rate of the high-ability type. The intuition is that an increase (a 
decrease) in the hours of work supplied by the low-ability (high-ability) type leads to 
less outsourcing, which contributes to relax the self-selection constraint and reduce the 
payment to foreign residents. This is analogous to a result derived by Aronsson and 
Koskela (2009a), yet with the modification that the budget effect was absent in their 
study. The implications of outsourcing for the marginal labor income tax structure are 
summarized as follows; 
 
Proposition 1. In the North, and under assumption A1, the direct effect of 
outsourcing is to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type and increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the high-
ability type. 
 
Proposition 1 is interpretable to mean that the outsourcing contributes to a more 
progressive labor income tax structure in the country that outsources production abroad. 
This policy response causes the level of outsourcing to decrease which, in turn, leads to 
less wage-inequality and reduces the payments to foreign residents. 
 


























                                                 
10     Note that the appearance of outsourcing may also indirectly affect each tax formula by changing the 
magnitude of the other terms (i.e. the terms that would also appear in the absence of outsourcing).   16
to be the marginal rate of substitution between the present and future consumption for 
ability type i and the mimicker, respectively. For the low-ability type, the marginal 
capital income tax rate can be derived by combining equations (A2), (A3), (A7) and (5), 
and for the high-ability type by combining equations (A5), (A6), (A7) and (5). We show 
in the Appendix that the marginal capital income tax rates can be written as 
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                                                                                                                     (23) 
 
The first row on the right hand side of equation (22), and the first term on the right hand 
side of equation (23), reflect motives for capital income taxation that are well 
understood from earlier literature (e.g., Brett 1997; Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001). We 
summarize these incentive effects as follows. If 
1, 2,
,, ,, ˆ ()
tt
ncx ncx MRS MRS >< , meaning that 
the low-ability type attaches a higher (lower) relative value to the current consumption 
than the mimicker, there will be an incentive for the government to encourage 
(discourage) early consumption for the low-ability type via a higher (lower) marginal 
capital income tax rate. As such, this incentive effect serves to relax the self-selection 
constraint, as it makes mimicking less attractive. The second term on the right hand side 
of equation (22) and the analogous first term on the right hand side of equation (23) 
appear because a change in the capital stock directly affects the wage ratio and, 
therefore, also the number of work hours that the mimicker needs to supply in order to 
reach the same income as the low-ability type. If   ,1 ,1 /0 ( 0 ) nt nt K φ ++ ∂ ∂> < , meaning that 
an increase (a decrease) in the capital stock contributes to relax the self-selection 
constraint, there is an incentive for the government to encourage (discourage) savings 
by implementing lower (higher) marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types 
than it would otherwise have done.   17
 
In a way similar to the marginal labor income tax rates discussed above, the final 
two terms in each tax formula are due to the appearance of outsourcing, and their joint 
influence will also in this case be referred as the direct effect of outsourcing. As before, 
the first component reflects that a change in the use of outsourced labor affects the self-
selection constraint, and the second is a budget effect due to that part of the output 
generated by domestic firms are used to pay for foreign labor services. Given 
assumption A1, both these components contribute to increase the marginal capital 
income tax rates. The intuition is that a decrease in the capital stock leads to less 
outsourcing which, in turn, relaxes the self-selection constraint and reduces the 
payments to foreign residents. We have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 2. In the North, and under assumption A1, the direct effect of 
outsourcing is to increase the marginal capital income tax rates for both 
ability-types. 
 
In the North, therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 together imply a distinct modification of 
tax policy by comparison with the standard optimal income tax model: to discourage 
outsourcing, there is an incentive for the government to implement a more progressive 
labor income tax structure and higher marginal capital income tax rates than it would 
otherwise have done. 
 
Note also that the direct effect of outsourcing on the marginal capital income tax 
rate relates to intertermporal production-inefficiency in an interesting way, as it 
contributes to a discrepancy between the ratio of shadow prices of capital,  ,, 1 / nt nt γ γ + , 
and the interest factor,  ,1 1 nt r + + . This is seen from the first order condition for  ,1 nt K + , i.e. 
equation (A7) in the Appendix, which can be written as 
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Equation (24) extends a corresponding result derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), 
where the discrepancy between the shadow price ratio and the interest factor was due 
solely to the first term on the right hand side (as the capital stock has a direct effect on 
the domestic wage ratio). Here, two additional effects appear as a consequence of 
outsourcing, which are summarized by the second and third terms on the right hand 
side. The intuition is, of course, that the capital stock in the northern economy in period 
t+1 is directly correlated with the hours of work by southern low-skilled labor 
employed by northern firms, 
1
,1 ns t l + , and the southern low-skilled wage rate, 
1
,1 s t w + , in 
period t+1. Both these effects contribute to underprovision of capital relative to the first 
best policy rule. 
 
3.2    Optimal Taxation in the South 
 
The optimal tax problem in the southern economy will be written such that the 
government chooses 
1
, s t l , 
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subject to equations (10), (14) and (17). The government in the South treats the 
decision-variables of the northern government as exogenous. The first order conditions 
are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Income taxation in the South is governed by the same general incentives as in the 
North with two important exceptions. First, increased outsourcing leads to less wage-
inequality and, therefore, higher welfare for the South. This is seen by differentiating 
the Lagrangean with respect to 
1
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Second, increased outsourcing leads to more factor income from abroad. In other words, 
and contrary to the government in the North, the southern government has an incentive 
to stimulate outsourcing.   19
 
To shorten the notation, as the components of the tax formulas that are not due 
explicitly to outsourcing take the same general form here as the did for the northern 
economy, we use 
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to denote the policy rules for marginal labor income taxation that would apply in the 
absence of outsourcing. The policy incentives embedded in these formulas are 
analogous to, and have the same interpretations as, the corresponding effects derived for 
the North above and will, therefore, not be further discussed here. The marginal labor 
income tax rates can then be characterized as follows; 
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The final two terms in each tax formula, the joint influence of which is again 
interpretable as a direct effect of outsourcing, reflect incentives that are in a sense 
opposite to those facing the northern government, as the South (contrary to the North) 
has an incentive to encourage outsourcing. Despite this, and somewhat surprisingly, 
outsourcing affects the marginal labor income tax rates in the southern economy in a 
way that partly resembles the results derived for the North. This is seen from the second 
term on the right hand side of equation (25) and (26), respectively, which provides an 
incentive for the southern government to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for 
the low-ability-type and increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability 
type. However, it does so for a different reason than the one behind the analogous 
policy response in the North. The intuition is, instead, that the southern government can 
only influence the outsourcing indirectly via the wage rate for the low-ability type. An 
increase in the hours of work supplied by the low-ability type leads to a lower before tax   20
wage rate for the low-ability type which, in turn, leads to increased outsourcing, i.e. 
1
, ns t l  
increases. A decrease in the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type also leads to 
a lower before tax wage rate for the low-ability type (as the two types of labor are 
complements in terms of the production function) and, therefore, to increased 
outsourcing. As indicated above, the reason as to why increased outsourcing is desirable 
in the South is that it relaxes the self-selection constraint. 
 
However, the budget effect (the third term on the right hand side) works in the 
opposite direction here, as a decrease in the before tax wage rate of the low-ability type 
reduces the factor income from abroad. Therefore, the budget effect counteracts the 
incentive to relax the self-selection constraint and implies, instead, an incentive for the 
government in the South to increase the marginal labor income tax rate of the low-
ability type and decrease the marginal labor income tax rate of the high-ability type. 
 
We have derived the following result; 
 
Proposition 3. (i) Increased outsourcing leads to less wage inequality for 
the southern economy and contributes, therefore, to relax the self-selection 
constraint. This provides an incentive for the government in the South to 
implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type 
and a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type than 
it would otherwise have done. (ii) Reduced hours of work by the low-
ability type and increased hours of work by the high-ability type contribute 
to increase the budgetary gain of outsourcing for the southern economy, 
which provides an incentive for the government in the South to implement 
a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and a 
lower marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type than it 
would otherwise have done. 
 
Therefore, and contrary to the results derived for the northern economy, the two terms 
comprising the direct effect of outsourcing in each tax formula work in opposite 
directions here. The relative size of these components determines whether outsourcing   21
motivates higher or lower marginal labor income tax rates than in the standard optimal 
income tax model without outsourcing. 
 
Turning to capital income taxation, we use 
1
,1 s t μ +  and 
2
,1 s t μ + , respectively, as a 
short notation for the marginal capital income tax formula that would apply in the 
absence of outsourcing, i.e. the marginal capital income tax rate in the standard two-
type model. We have 
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which are analogous to their counterparts for the northern economy analyzed above and 
will not be further discussed here. We can then write the marginal capital income tax 
rates in the South as follows; 
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By analogy to the effects of outsourcing on the marginal labor income tax rates, 
outsourcing gives rise to two counteracting effects on the marginal capital income tax 
rate. First, a decrease in the capital stock leads to a lower pre-tax wage rate for the low-
ability type which, in turn, leads to increased outsourcing. This effect is summarized by 
the second term on the right hand side of equation (27) and provides an incentive for the 
government to increase the marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types. The 
intuition is that increased outsourcing leads to a relaxation of the self-selection 
constraint and, therefore, increased welfare in the southern economy. Second, the lower 
before tax wage rate following a decrease in the capital stock reduces the factor income 
from abroad, which implies a welfare loss for the southern economy. To avoid this 
welfare loss, there is an incentive for the government to implement lower marginal 
capital income tax rates, which explains the final term on the right hand side of the tax   22
formula. Note also that, if we were to derive a counterpart to equation (24) for the 
southern economy, we may also in this case interpret the direct effect of outsourcing in 
each capital tax formula as a consequence of intertemporal production-inefficiency at 
the second best optimum. 
 
We summarize the effects of outsourcing on the marginal capital income tax rates by the 
following proposition; 
 
Proposition 4. (i) A decrease in the capital stock leads to a lower pre-tax 
wage rate for the low-ability type, ceteris paribus, which contributes to 
increased outsourcing and, therefore, a relaxation of the self-selection 
constraint. This provides an incentive for the government in the South to 
implement higher marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-types 
than it would otherwise have done. (ii) An increase in the capital stock 
leads to a higher pre-tax wage rate for the low-ability type and, therefore, 
to increased factor income from the North. This provides an incentive for 
the government in the South to implement lower marginal capital income 
tax rates for both ability-types. 
 
Propositions 3 and 4 describe two counteracting mechanisms via which 
outsourcing affects the income tax structure in the South. Note also that the size of the 
budget effect (discussed in the second part of each proposition) depends on the number 
of labor hours that the northern firms outsource to the South, 
1
, ns t l . Therefore, the 
following result is an immediate consequence of Propositions 3 and 4; 
 
Corollary 1. If the size of outsourced labor, 
1
















then the direct effects of outsourcing on the southern tax structure in 
period t will be to decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-
ability type, increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-
ability type and increase the marginal capital income tax rates. If, on the 
other hand, 
1

















then the direct effect of outsourcing on the southern tax structure in period 
t will be to increase the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability 
type, decrease the marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type 
and decrease the marginal capital income tax rates. 
 
The corollary means that the qualitative policy response to outsourcing is related to the 
level of outsourcing. As long as the level of outsourcing is low, the government in the 
South will respond to outsourcing by increased labor income tax progression and higher 
marginal capital income tax rates, i.e., adjust the tax structure in the same qualitative 
way as the Northern government. However, if the level of outsourcing increases over 
time (if, e.g., the outsourcing cost of the North decreases over time for some reason), we 
may eventually reach a point where the government in the south responds by 
implementing a less progressive labor income tax and lower marginal capital income tax 
rates than it would have done, had outsourcing not been an option for firms in the North. 
In this case, where the level of outsourcing is relatively high, the optimal policy 
response by the southern government will be qualitatively the opposite from that of its 
northern counterpart. 
 
4. Policy Cooperation 
 
In Section 3, we analyzed a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each country 
implements its own tax policy and treats the tax policy decided upon by the other 
national government as exogenous. Since the policy implemented by either country 
affects the well-being of the residents in the other country as well, the noncooperative 
equilibrium is not efficient from the perspective of society as a whole. Therefore, policy 
cooperation (if designed appropriately) will lead to higher welfare. 
 
There are several possible approaches to address policy cooperation; the most 
common in earlier theoretical literature is probably to assume that the resource 
allocation is decided upon by a social planner, whose objective is to maximize welfare 
for society as a whole subject to all resources available. However, this approach is not   24
particularly realistic from the perspective of real world public policy. It is, instead, 
much more realistic to assume that the countries agree upon reforms, the purposes of 
which are to improve the resource allocation by comparison with the initial equilibrium. 
We will follow the latter approach here by considering two policy reforms designed to 
target work hours and capital formation, respectively. In each such reform, the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium is treated as the initial, prereform, equilibrium. 
 
Suppose that policy cooperation is governed by a utilitarian objective 
 
  ns WWW =+                                                      (28) 
 
in which we give equal weight to the national welfare functions. By recalling that the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium means that each national government has made an 
optimal policy choice conditional on the policies chosen by the other country, one can 
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The intuition behind equations (29) is straight forward. As each national government 
has already made an optimal choice of work hours at the national level via the labor 
income tax, a small increase in the hours of work does not affect the domestic welfare; 
it only affects welfare in the other country via the (uninternalized) externalities that 
outsourcing give rise to. The signs of equations (29a) and (29b) follow from assumption 










 for  1,2 i = , and  , j ns = , 
in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, since private consumption does not give rise to 
international externalities. As a consequence, any change in private consumption 
induced by a change in the hours of work has no first order welfare effect in the initial 
equilibrium. 
 
Let us start with coordinated changes in the hours of work. With equations (28) 
and (29) at our disposal, it is straight forward to derive the following result; 
 
Proposition 5. (i) Under assumption A1, a small decrease in the hours of 
work supplied by the northern low-ability type accompanied by a small 
increase in the hours of work supplied by the northern high-ability type 
















 ( 0 < ), 
then a small decrease (increase) in the hours of work supplied by the 
southern low-ability type accompanied by a small increase (decrease) in 
the hours of hours work supplied by the southern high-ability type leads to 
higher welfare in the North. 
 
Proposition 5 suggests that a coordinated change in the labor and capital income taxes 
can be designed to give higher welfare in both countries. The government is the North 
may implement the labor supply adjustment indicated by the first part of the proposition 
via increased marginal labor income taxation for the low-ability type and decreased 
marginal labor income taxation for the high-ability type, i.e. in a sense reduce the 
degree of labor tax progression, while at the same time changing the average labor 
income tax rates and the capital income tax to retain budget balance and adjust the 
capital stock to its original equilibrium path. For the government is the South, the 
problem is analogous, except that it should either increase the marginal labor income tax 
rate for the low-ability type and decrease it for the high-ability type, or decrease the 
marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type and increase it for the high-
ability type, depending on whether 
11 1
,, , , (/) nt n st st n st lw l Λ∂ ∂ −  is positive or negative.   26
 
Finally, we analyze the welfare effects of a coordinated change in the capital 
stock. By differentiating equation (28) with respect to  , nt K  and  , s t K , respectively, and 
evaluating the resulting derivative in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, we have 
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Equations (30a) and (30b) imply the following result; 
 
Proposition 6. (i) Under assumption A1, a small increase in the northern 
















 ( 0 < ), 
a small increase (decrease) in the southern capital stock leads to higher 
welfare in the North. 
  
A coordinated policy reform with the effects presented in Proposition 6 also requires a 
combined change in the labor and capital income taxes. The government in the North 
may implement the first part of the proposition by decreasing the marginal capital 
income tax rates, while changing the average capital income tax rates and the labor 
income tax to retain budget balance as well as adjust the hours of work along the 
original equilibrium path. For the government in the South, the decision is analogous, 
except that it should either decrease or increase the marginal capital income tax rates 
depending on whether 
11 1
,, , , (/) nt n st st n st lw l Λ∂ ∂ −  is positive or negative. 
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
   27
Outsourcing has so far received surprisingly little attention in the literature on optimal 
income taxation. The present paper attempts to fill (part of) this gap by analyzing 
optimal labor income and capital income taxation in an OLG economy comprising two 
countries, where one of them (referred to as North) locates part of its low-skill 
production activities in the other (referred to as South). Each country is characterized by 
two ability-types and asymmetric information between the government and the private 
sector. Based on this framework, we analyze the tax policies implemented by each 
country in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each national government treats 
the tax policy of the other country as exogenous, as well as policy coordination 
targeting the hours of work and capital formation, respectively. 
 
Our results show that outsourcing by domestic firms provides an incentive for the 
government in the North to implement a lower marginal labor income tax rate for the 
low-ability type and a higher marginal labor income tax rate for the high-ability type, 
i.e. in this sense a more progressive labor income tax structure, and higher marginal 
capital income tax rates for both ability-types than it would otherwise have done. The 
intuition is that reduced outsourcing – a consequence of this policy response – leads to a 
more equal wage distribution in the North, which relaxes the self-selection constraint. In 
addition, reduced outsourcing contributes to lower the southern wage rate for low-
skilled labor, meaning that less factor income is transferred to the southern economy. In 
the South, which receives foreign production structure and employment opportunities 
for its own labor force from abroad, outsourcing gives rise to two counteracting 
incentives. First, increased outsourcing leads to less wage-inequality in the South, which 
constitutes an incentive for the southern government to implement a lower marginal 
labor income tax rate for the low-ability type, a higher marginal labor income tax rate 
for the high-ability type and higher marginal capital income tax rates for both ability-
types than it would otherwise have done. The intuition is that these policy responses 
contribute to relax the self-selection constraint. Second, a decrease in the wage rate paid 
to low-skilled labor in the South also means less factor income from the North; a budget 
effect which calls for policy responses opposite to those just described. Therefore, the 
responses to outsourcing in terms of marginal income taxation by the southern 
government are, in general, ambiguous: if the level of outsourcing is sufficiently small 
(large), then the self-selection effect dominates (is dominated by) the budget effect in 
terms how the southern government responds to outsourcing.   28
 
With the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as our reference case, we also show 
that policy coordination leading to a decrease in the hours of work supplied by the 
northern low-ability type, an increase in the hours of work supplied by the northern 
high-ability type and an increase in the northern capital stock, respectively, is welfare 
improving for the South. The corresponding changes in work hours and capital 
formation that the South ought to implement depends on how the welfare in the northern 
economy changes in response to an increase in the wage rate paid to low-skilled labor in 
the South. 
 
Future research might take several new directions, and we briefly discuss two of 
them. First, we have completely neglected the role of non-competitive wage formation. 
If the North is thought of as a European economy, it would clearly be relevant to allow 
trade-unions to affect wage formation for low-skilled workers and, as a consequence, 
allow for equilibrium unemployment among the low-skilled in the North.
11 As trade-
unions (most likely) attempt to push up the wage rate above the competitive level, there 
might be an even stronger incentive for firms in the North to outsource production 
capacity to the South. Therefore, non-competitive wage formation is important both for 
the public policy implemented by the national government and for the welfare effects of 
policy cooperation. Second, to be able to compare our results with those of the standard 
optimal income model, allowing us to capture the effects of outsourcing in the simplest 
possible way, we have disregarded other possible sources of interaction between the 
countries (e.g., factor mobility and final goods trade). Such an extension is clearly 
relevant here; for instance, labor mobility from the South to the North (due to higher 
wages in the North) may, to some extent, offset the incentives for outsourcing. It may 
also necessitate policy adjustments other than those described above. We leave these 
and other extensions for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
11   Such an extension may also include product market imperfections. There is a growing literature 
dealing with relationships between non-competitive wage formation, product market 
imperfections, globalization and outsourcing, although so far with a focus on issues other than 
redistribution via optimal income taxation. See, e.g., Naylor (1998, 1999), Lommerud et al. (2003) 
and Lommerud et al. (2009). See also Aloi et al. (2009) for a study of capital market integration 
when countries differ with respect to competition in the labor market. 
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To derive the marginal labor income tax rate for the low-ability type, combine equations 
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By using 
11 1 1 ' 1 1
,, , , , , , , , /( ) nt ntz ntc nt nt nt nt wu u w T w l −=  from equation (4), substituting into equation 
(A8) and rearranging, we obtain equation (20). The marginal labor income tax rate of 
the high-ability type can be derived in the same general way by combining equations 
(A4), (A5) and (4). 
 
The marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type can be derived by 
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Next, solve equation (A7) for  , nt γ  and substitute into equation (A9). Finally, by using 
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rearranging, we obtain (22). The marginal capital income tax rate of the high-ability 
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The marginal labor income tax rates and marginal capital income tax rates can be 




Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (2001) Productivity Differences. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116, 563-606. 
Aloi, M., Leite-Monteiro, M. and Lloyd-Braga, T. (2009) Unionized Labor Markets and 
Globalized Capital Markets. Journal of International Economics 78, 149-153. 
Amiti, M. and Wei, S-J. (2005) Fear of Service Outsourcing: Is It Justified. Economic 
Policy 42, 307-347. 
Aronsson, T. and Johansson-Stenman, O. (in press) Positional Concerns in an OLG 
Model: Optimal Labor and Capital Income Taxation. International Economic 
Review. 
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2009a) Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A 
Note. Economics Letters 102, 135-137. 
Aronsson, T. and Koskela, E. (2009b) Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of 
Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4196, May, University of Bonn. 
Aronsson, T., Sjögren, T. and Dalin, T. (2009) Optimal Taxation and Redistribution in 
an OLG Model with Unemployment. International Tax and Public Finance 16, 
198-218.   32
Brett, C. (1997) A Note on Nonlinear Taxation in an Overlapping Generations Model. 
Department of Economics, University of Essex, mimeo. 
Egger, H. and Egger, P. (2006) International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-
Skilled Labor in the EU, Economic  Inquiry 44, 237-258. 
Egger, H. and Falkinger, J. (2006): The Role of Public Infrastructure and Subsidies for 
Firm Location and International Outsourcing, European Economic Review 50, 
1993-2015. 
Ethier, W.J. (2005) Globalization, Globalisation: Trade, Technology and Wages, 
International Review of Economics and Finance 14, 237-258. 
Feenstra, R.C. and Hanson, G.H. (1999) The Impact of Outsourcing and High-
Technology Capital on Wages. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 907-940. 
Feenstra, R.C. and Hanson, G.H. (2003) Global Production Sharing and Rising 
Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages. NBER Working Paper No. 8372, 
published in: Kwan Choi, E. and J. Harrigan (2003) (eds): Handbook of 
International Trade, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 146-185.   
Geishecker, I. and Görg, H. (2005) Do Unskilled Workers Always Lose from 
Fragmentation?,  North American Journal of Economics and Finance 16, 81-92. 
Geishecker, I. and Görg, H. (2008) Winners and Losers: A Micro-Level Analysis of 
International Outsourcing and Wages. Canadian Journal of Economics 41, 243-
270. 
Haskel, J. and Slaughter, M.J. (2001) Trade, Technology and U.K. Wage Inequality, 
Economic Journal 111, 163-187. 
Hijzen, A. (2007) International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage 
Inequality. Review of International Economics 15, 188-205. 
Hijzen, A. Görg, H. and Hine, R.C. (2005) International Outsourcing and the Skill 
Structure of Labor Demand in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal 115, 860-
878. 
Hsieh, C-T. and Woo, K.T. (2005) The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong 
Kong’s Labor Market, American Economic Review 95, 1673-1687.  
Hummels, D. Jun, I. and Yi, K.-M. (2001) The Nature and Growth of Vertical 
Specialization in World Trade. Journal of International Economics 54, 75-96.   
Keuschnigg, C. and Ribi, E. (2009) Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare. Journal 
of International Economics 78, 168-176. 
Koskela, E. and Poutvaara, P. (2008a) Outsourcing and Labor Taxation in Dual Labor 
Markets, CESifo Working Paper No. 2333, June.  
K Ko os sk ke el la a, ,   E E. .   a an nd d   P Po ou ut tv va aa ar ra a, ,   P P. .   ( (2 20 00 08 8b b) )   F Fl le ex xi ib bl le e   O Ou ut ts so ou ur rc ci in ng g   a an nd d   t th he e   I Im mp pa ac ct ts s   o of f   L La ab bo ou ur r   
T Ta ax xa at ti io on n   i in n   E Eu ur ro op pe ea an n   W We el lf fa ar re e   S St ta at te es s, ,   C CE ES Si if fo o   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er r   N No o. .   2 24 44 40 0, ,   O Oc ct to ob be er r   
2 20 00 08 8. .   33
Koskela, E. and Poutvaara, P. (2009) Is There Scope for Gains from Revenue-Neutral 
Labor Tax Reforms with Flexible Outsourcing? IZA Discussion Paper No. 3984, 
January, University of Bonn. 
Koskela, E. and Schöb, R. (2008) Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact of 
Labour Market Policy Reforms. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3566, June, University 
of Bonn. Forthcoming in Review of International Economics.  
Koskela, E. and Stenbacka, R. (2007) Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing 
and Wage Solidarity under Labor Market Imperfections, CESifo Working paper 
No. 1988. 
Lommerud, K.E., Meland, F. and Sorgand, I. (2003) Unionized Oligopoly, Trade 
Liberalization and Location Choice. Economic Journal 113, 782-800. 
Lommerud, K.E., Meland, F. and Straume, O.R. (2009) Can Deunionization Lead to 
International Outsourcing? Journal of International Economics 77, 109-119. 
Munch, J.R. and Skaksen, J.R. (2009) Specialization, Outsourcing and Wages, Review 
of World Economics 145, 57-73.   
Naylor, R. (1998) International Trade and Economic Integration When Labor Markets 
are Generally Unionized. European Economic Review 42, 1251-1267. 
Naylor, R, (1999) Union Wage Strategies and International Trade. Economic Journal 
109, 102-125. 
Ordover, J. E. and Phelps, E. S. (1979) The Concept of Optimal Taxation in the 
Overlapping Generations Model of Capital and Wealth. Journal of Public 
Economics 12, 1-26. 
Pirttilä, J. and Tuomala, M. (2001) On Optimal Non-Linear Taxation and Public Good 
Provision in an Overlapping Generations Economy,” Journal of Public Economics 
79, 485-501. 
Rishi, M. and Saxena, S. (2004) Is Outsourcing Really as Bad as it May Sound? 
Pittsburg University, working paper. 
Sinn, H-W. (2007) The Welfare State and Forces of Globalization, CESifo Working 
Paper No 1925. 
Stefanova, B.M. (2006) The Political Economy of Outsourcing in the European Union 
and the East-European Enlargement, Business and Politics 8, issue 2. 
Stern, N.H. (1982) Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration. Journal of Public 
Economics 17, 181-211. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation. Journal of Public 
Economics 17, 213-240. 
Wilson, J.D. (1986) A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition. Journal of Urban 
Economics 21, 296-315. 
Wilson, J.D. (1999) Theories on Tax Competition. National Tax Journal 52, 269-304. 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
 
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
 
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009  
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
 
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
  
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 
 
2748 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Apostolis Pavlou, Upstream Horizontal Mergers and 
Efficiency Gains, August 2009 
 
2749 Rüdiger Pethig and Christian Wittlich, Interaction of Carbon Reduction and Green 
Energy Promotion in a Small Fossil-Fuel Importing Economy, August 2009 
 
2750 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Monetary Policy 
Transmission and House Prices: European Cross-country Evidence, August 2009 
 
2751 Olaf Posch, Explaining Output Volatility: The Case of Taxation, August 2009 
 
2752 Beatrice Scheubel, Daniel Schunk and Joachim Winter, Don’t Raise the Retirement 
Age! An Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms and East-West Differences in 
Germany, August 2009 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009 
 
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
 
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
  
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009 
 
2773 Erdal Yalcin, Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export, 
August 2009 
 
2774 Klaus Abberger, Wolfgang Nierhaus and Shynar Shaikh, Findings of the Signal 
Approach for Financial Monitoring in Kazakhstan, September 2009 
 
2775 Sascha O. Becker, Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, The Trade-off 
between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition, 
September 2009 
 
2776 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy, September 2009 